Open Innovation: Old Ideas in a fancy tuxedo remedy a false dichotomy.
Introduction
In the four years since the publication of our original paper (Trott & Hartmann, 2009) , we have received numerous email correspondence from scholars of innovation management thanking us for our critique. In this chapter we have added a discussion at the end about the increasing number of alleged industrial espionage cases in the business press. It may be that together with an open innovation strategy a firm needs also to adopt a tight IP protection strategy. We also discuss and acknowledge a few of the significant papers that have made useful contributions to this stream of research.
While Chesbrough (2003; partly acknowledges the rich source of antecedents to the "open innovation paradigm" there may be many scholars of R&D management and innovation management who would argue that this paradigm represents little more than the repackaging and representation of concepts and findings presented over the past forty years within the literature on innovation management. In short, it is old wine in new bottles. Since we published our original paper (Trott & Hartmann, 2009 ) open innovation has continued to remain a popular subject of interest to both practitioners and academics alike. The intention of our paper was to try to raise a few issues of critique to a concept that we felt had emerged onto the innovation studies field with very little academic criticism. Since then there have been hundreds of papers on open innovation but only a few that have provided a critique (Dahlander & Gann 2010; Enkel & Lenz, 2009; Huizingh, 2011) .
Within the field of R&D Management it is the pioneering work of Alan Pearson and Derek Ball more than thirty years ago that has done so much to develop thinking in this area (cf. Pearson et al., 1979; Griffiths & Pearson, 1973) . With regards to innovation management, the network model of innovation, advocated by Rothwell & Zegveld (1985) more than twenty years ago, emphasised the need for external linkages within the innovation process. Moreover, as far back as 1959, Carter & Williams uncovered that a key characteristic of technically progressive firms was their high quality of incoming information. Indeed, Thomas Allen"s work on Gatekeepers in the 1960s also showed the importance of good external linkages to acquire information and knowledge from outside the organisation (Allen, 1969 ). SPRU"s Project SAPPHO (1974) also confirmed the need for high quality external linkages in successful innovation. Clearly, there is plenty of evidence from many years ago stressing the need for firms to work beyond their own boundaries. In addition, previous research has shown that industrial companies that conduct their own R&D are better able to access externally available information (e.g. Tilton, 1971; Allen, 1977 , Mowery, 1983 Cohen & Levinthal, 1989) . So, R&D departments have long recognised the importance of information and knowledge beyond their own organisations. Moreover, substantial efforts have been undertaken to improve the ability of firms to acquire external knowledge. For example, firms have spent large sums of money addressing issues such as the not invented here syndrome (NIH), scanning and networking, and absorptive capacity. Furthermore, sixteen years ago, Rothwell (1992) presented the case for a 5 th generation model of R&D management, where he emphasised the need for increased external focus utilising information technologies. Obviously, the need for firms to adopt a more outward-looking focus to their R&D, technology management and NPD has been repeatedly stressed by many authors. Significantly, Tidd (1993) explained how an open and connected model of innovation facilitates the development of products and services that cross traditional technological and market boundaries in the home automotion industry. Furthermore, there has been research that examines specific issues with respect to increasing collaborations amongst firms. For example, Hoecht & Trott (1999) discussed the problems of information leakage with respect to open and closed sytems of technology acquisition. It is hardly surprising then that some within the field raised their eyebrows at the suggestion that innovation needs to adopt a new paradigm, one that is "open" rather than closed.
To help set the scene for what seems to have been a widespread uncritical adoption of the open innovation concept, Table 1 summarises the wide publicity that it has received within the innovation management literature. This table also presents a thematic analysis of papers and books that cite the term "open innovation". Chesbrough (2003a Chesbrough ( , 2003b Chesbrough ( , 2003c Chesbrough ( , 2004 Chesbrough ( , 2006 Vanhaverbeke (2006) Source: Fredberg et al. (2008) . Chesbrough (2003) presents six notions that lie behind the so called closed model of innovation (see Table 2 ). The problem here is that he uses a straw man argument, which misrepresents the true position of innovation management today. Creating this fallacy about "closed innovation" systems makes it is easy to refute and demolish it (as he does), which is what should happen if it were at all true. However, it is not, and certainly not within enlightened firms. Indeed, it is so misleading and inaccurate as to be offensive to the progressive firms who have studied R&D management and invested large sums of money in their own R&D processes. Given this historical backdrop, the next section examines the so called principles of the so called closed model of innovation against the established innovation management literature. 
Closed innovation principles
Open innovation principles i
The smart people in our field work for us. Not all of the smart people work for us so we must find and tap into the knowledge and expertise of bright individuals outside our company. ii
To profit from R&D, we must discover, develop, produce and ship it ourselves.
External R&D can create significant value; internal R&D is needed to claim some portion of that value. iii
If we discover it ourselves, we will get it to market first.
We don"t have to originate the research in order to profit from it. iv If we are the first to commercialize an innovation, we will win.
Building a better business model is better than getting to market first. v If we create the most and best ideas in the industry, we will win.
If we make the best use of internal and external ideas, we will win. vi
We should control our intellectual property (IP) so that our competitors do not profit from our ideas.
We should profit from others" use of our IP, and we should buy others" IP whenever it advances our own business model. Source: Chesbrough (2003) .
An examination of the evidence of the closed innovation principles
i. The smart people in our field work for us.
The notion that the "old" closed model of innovation is based on the premise that firms believed they employed all the smart people is misguided. It was Thomas Allen of MIT who in the early 1960s identified that there was much technology and expertise beyond the boundary of the firm (Allen, 1969) . His work identified and popularized the role of the gatekeeper: someone who was able to help link scientists within the firm to groups of scientists outside the firm so they may exchange knowledge and information which improves the performance of R&D research groups. Michael Tushman added to this body of work by exploring the wider notion of boundary spanners: those individuals (not just within an R&D setting) who collect and exchange knowledge and information on behalf of the firm (Tushman, 1977) . These significant bodies of work are conveniently overlooked in order to strengthen the first principle of the closed innovation model.
The innovation literature for many years has emphasized interaction. Indeed, innovation has been described as an information-creation process that arises out of social interaction. In effect, the firm provides a structure within which the creative process is located (Nonaka & Kenney, 1991) . It is these interactions that provide the opportunity for thoughts, potential ideas and views to be shared and exchanged. This view is supported by a study of Japanese firms (Nonaka, 1991) where the creation of new knowledge within an organization depends on tapping the tacit and often highly subjective insights, intuitions and hunches of individual employees and making those insights available for testing and use by the organization as a whole. This implies that certain knowledge and skills, embodied in the term "know-how", are not easily understood; moreover they are less able to be communicated. This would suggest that to gain access to such knowledge one may have to be practicing in this or related areas of knowledge. Cohen & Levinthal (1990: 130) refer to this condition as "lockout", suggesting that failure to invest in research and technology will limit the ability of an organization to capture technological opportunities: "once off the technological escalator it is difficult to get back on".
So, the available literature informs us that R&D managers have recognized for over 100 years that not all knowledge and expertise resides within their firm. Moreover, for the past fifty years R&D Managers have been exploring how best to exploit knowledge beyond the firm.
ii. To profit from R&D, we must discover, develop and ship it ourselves.
Technology partnerships between and in some cases among organizations have been rising rapidly since the 1970s. From 1976 to 1987, the annual number of new joint ventures rose six fold; by 1987, three-quarters of these were in high-technology industries (Faulkner, 1995; Kaufman et al., 2000; Lewis, 1990) . As the costs, including risk associated with R&D efforts, continued to increase, no company could remain a "technology island" and stay competitive. Vyas et al., 1995 suggested that we were witnessing the fall of the "go-it-alone" strategy and the rise of the octopus strategy.
This was recognition that businesses were slowly beginning to broaden their view of their business environment from the traditional "go-it-alone" perspective of individual firms competing against each other. The formation of strategic alliances meant that strategic power now resides in sets of firms acting together. Further evidence that co-operation and alliances between firms is nothing new can be illustrated by the wide types of alliances that exist. Moreover, they can involve a customer, a supplier or even a competitor (Chan & Heide, 1993) . The literature has identified at least eight generic types of strategic alliance (Bleeke & Ernst, 1993; Gulati, 1995; Faulkner, 1995; Conway & Stewart, 1998): licensing, supplier relations, outsourcing, joint venture, collaboration (non-joint ventures), R&D consortia, industry clusters, innovation networks.
In addition, the notion within the "closed innovation" model that firms have been undertaking all the activities including discovering, manufacturing and distributing themselves is misleading as Table 3 clearly illustrates. (2001), Budden (2003) .
Finally, the open innovation concept seems to overlook all the research on technology transfer and absorptive capacity, which emphasized the need to focus efforts not just on accessing technology, but also on recognizing that in order to profit from technology developed outside the organization a firm must undertake R&D to absorb the benefits (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989; Trott & Cordey-Hayes, 1993 ).
One of the more challenging issues for R&D Managers is when to outsource R&D activities; with the inherent risks associated with this activity of giving away critical core competences to others.
iii. If we discover it ourselves, we will get it to market first.
The industrial R&D landscape is full of evidence to the contrary of this third principle of the closed innovation model. For example, Corning is unique among major corporations in deriving the majority of its turnover from joint ventures and alliances. The company has a long and impressive heritage: as a specialist glass manufacturer it had its own R&D laboratory as far back as 1908. In the 1930s it began combining its R&D with other firms in other industries, giving it access to a wide variety of growth markets. An alliance with PPG gave it access to the flat glass building market; an alliance with Owens provided access to the glass fibres market and an alliance with Dow Chemicals provided it with an opportunity to enter the silicon products market. Corning now has a network of strategic alliances based on a range of different technologies. Technology scanning is rather narrowly defined by Granstrand et al. (1992) as both illegal and legal forms of acquiring technological know-how from outside.
The classification of technology-acquisition strategies offered by Granstrand et al. (1995) provides an illustration of the numerous ways of acquiring external technology. Other classifications can be found in the technology transfer literature: Auster (1987) ; Chesnais (1988) ; Hagedoorn (1990) ; Lefever (1992) .
It is necessary to counsel caution here, for there are clear potential financial benefits from being the owner of the proprietary technology and having secure intellectual property protection. For example, Pilkington developed the float glass manufacturing process and then licensed it to every glass manufacturer in the world.
iv. If we are the first to commercialize an innovation, we will win. Table 4 illustrate the wide range of industries that bear witness to the evidence that being first to market does not ensure victory. The innovation policy pursued by a firm cuts a wide path across functions such as manufacturing, finance, marketing, R&D and personnel, hence the importance attached to its consideration. The four broad innovation strategies commonly found in technologyintensive firms (Freeman, 1982; Maidique & Patch, 1988) are discussed below. These are not mutually exclusive or collectively exhaustive. A wide spectrum of other strategies is logically possible; indeed, very often a firm adopts a balanced portfolio approach with a range of products.
Nonetheless the key point here is that firms recognize innovation success involves more than simply being first to commercialise a technology.
Leader/offensive
The strategy here centres on the advantages to be gained from a monopoly, in this case a monopoly of the technology. The aim is to try to ensure that the product is launched into the market before the competition. This should enable the company either to adopt a price-skimming policy, or to adopt a penetration policy based on gaining a high market share. Such a strategy demands a significant R&D activity and is usually accompanied by substantial marketing resources to enable the company to promote the new product.
Fast follower/defensive
This strategy also requires a substantial technology base in order that the company may develop improved versions of the original, improved in terms of lower cost, different design, additional features, etc. The company needs to be agile in manufacturing, design and development and marketing. This will enable it to respond quickly to those companies that are first into the market.
Without any in-house R&D their response would have been much slower, as this would have involved substantially more learning and understanding of the technology.
Cost minimisation/imitative
This strategy is based on being a low-cost producer and success is dependent on achieving economies of scale in manufacture. The company requires exceptional skills and capabilities in production and process engineering. This is clearly similar to the defensive strategy, in that it involves following another company, except that the technology base is not usually as well developed as for the above two strategies. Technology is often licensed from other companies. This is a strategy that has been employed very effectively by the rapidly developing Asian economies.
With lower labour costs these economies have offered companies the opportunity to imitate existing products at lower prices, helping them enter and gain a foothold in a market, for example footwear or electronics. From this position it is then possible to incorporate design improvements to existing products (Hobday et al 2004) .
Market segmentation specialist/traditional
This strategy is based on meeting the precise requirements of a particular market segment or niche.
Large-scale manufacture is not usually required and the products tend to be characterised by few product changes. They are often referred to as traditional products. Indeed, some companies promote their products by stressing the absence of any change, for example Scottish whisky manufacturers.
Significantly, there are additional advantages to being first to market, such as building a scientific and innovation reputation. Sony, for example, while it has not always maximised revenue from its innovations (Betamax technology), it has nonetheless developed an enviable position for its technology. v. If we create the most and best ideas in the industry, we will win.
Once again a tired old argument has been put up so that it can be demolished. This principle seems to be based on the old idea that more R&D is better, whereas firms such as 3M and Pilkington know all too well that increased R&D expenditure without the corresponding link to new products leads to serious questions from your shareholders. In particular, investors rightly want to know what is happening to all the money that is being poured into research and technology. Hence, it is the ability to capture ideas from R&D and convert these into products and services that people want to buy that is more significant than idea generation. President Kennedy"s special address to the US Congress in 1961, in which he spoke of "putting a man on the moon before the decade was out", captured the popular opinion of that time. Many believed anything was possible with sufficient investment in technology development. This notion helps to explain one of the major areas of difficulty with R&D. Traditionally, it was viewed as a linear process, moving from research to engineering and then manufacture. That R&D was viewed as an overhead item was reinforced by Kennedy"s pledge to spend "whatever it costs", and indeed enormous financial resources were directed towards the project. Clearly, the Apollo project was a political decision -a unique situation without the usual economic or market forces at play.
Nevertheless, some sectors of industry have adopted a similar approach to that used by the space programme. Vast amounts of money were poured into R&D programmes in the belief that the interesting technology generated could then be incorporated into products (e.g., The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI; "Star Wars"); The International Space Station; Nuclear Fusion research). In many instances this is exactly what happened, but there were also many examples of exciting technology developed purely because it was interesting, without any consideration of the competitive market in which the business operated. Hence, many business leaders began to question the value of R&D.
This, of course, was almost fifty years ago and much has changed since. We now know that the management of research and development needs to be fully integrated with the strategic management process of the business. This will enhance and support the products that marketing and sales offer and provide the company with a technical body of knowledge that can be used for future development. Too many businesses fail to integrate the management of research and technology fully into the overall business strategy process (Adler et al., 1992) . A report by the European Industrial Management Association (EIRMA, 1985) recognised R&D as having three distinct areas, each requiring investment: R&D for existing businesses, R&D for new businesses, and R&D for exploratory research. It is these basic principles that drive R&D today not the narrow technology focused notion that firms conduct R&D for the sake of more technology.
vi. We should control our intellectual property (IP) so that our competitors do not profit from our ideas.
The sixth and final principle of the closed innovation model is simply unreasonable. One only has to look at the long history of licensing where firms have been trading intellectual property for decades.
The exchange of patents between fierce detergent rivals P&G and Unilever in the 1970s and the buying and selling of licences between firms in the chemical industry is an accepted way of doing business in these industries.
Famous licensing cases from Pilkington"s Float Glass process to JVC"s VHS cassette technology illustrate that when it comes to intellectual property firms know only too well that getting others involved is a necessary part of the process to achieve success. JVC won the VCR battle with Sony partly because it unlike Sony successfully secured joint venture partnerships and licensed its VHS technology to many other manufacturers ensuring that the VCR format was built into more machines than Sony"s Betamax format. Pilkington famously developed the float glass process for the manufacture of flat glass. Pilkington quickly recognised that enormous opportunities existed through licensing the manufacturing process to other glass manufacturers, that is competitors, rather than keeping the technology to itself.
Mutual self-interest is the common dominator behind most licensing contracts, as it is in other business contracts. Licences to competitors constitute a high percentage of all licences extended;
Microsoft"s disk-operating system (MS-DOS) is a case in point. These normally arise out of a desire on the part of the competitor to be free of any patent infringement in its development product features or technology. They are also due to the owner of the patent seeking financial gain from the technology. Other reasons for licensing include: to avoid or settle patent infringement issues;
to diversify and grow through the addition of new products; to access technology and improve the quality of existing products and or to obtain improved production or processing technology.
It is worthy of note here that following the open innovation prescription of buying and selling IP to advance our business model seems reasonable in theory. But, in practice when you are competing with other firms, trying to gain access to a technology that is already licensed to a competitor is extremely difficult. Indeed, firms frequently specify exclusive licensing arrangements to ensure others are unable to access the technology.
Using a false dichotomy to introduce the concept of Open Innovation
The Open Innovation paradigm is presented by contrasting it with the apparent old paradigm of In this chapter, we show that the dichotomy between closed innovation and open innovation may be true in theory, but does not really exist in industry, certainly not to the extent of the case of Xerox.
However, we recognize the advantage of using such a false dichotomy to get an important message across, even when many of the underlying principles of that message were already implemented many years ago by the majority of the companies addressed. It is a helpful and stimulating tactic to introduce a "new concept" (such as Open Innovation) to companies that are already most of the way there. Companies which "discover" that they have already implemented most of the principles of the new paradigm will be more eager to also consider the remaining changes needed to turn them into a genuine Open Innovator than companies that find themselves entirely stuck in the old paradigm. It is the psychology of encouraging someone who is (seemingly) already halfway there.
Natural selection (competition in a free market economy) would already have killed off companies that remained stuck in the old paradigm of closed innovation. While it is not known how many companies could have been labeled "closed innovators" (or simply "closed") in the past, it is obvious that such companies do not appear to exist today, except in very specialize fields with niche markets. Some prominent big corporations such as IBM and the aforementioned Xerox have unmistakably flirted with disaster by making some of the mistakes that Chesbrough lists as the notions of closed innovation (see Section 2). However, they overcame these shortcomings without the aid of the Open Innovation paradigm, which means that these ideas did already exist. Indeed, these cases are used as the inspiration to lay the foundation for the Open Innovation paradigm. Table 1 provides evidence of the widespread adoption of the Open Innovation concept. Managers and academics are sometimes accused of jumping on bandwagons, for fear of missing the latest popular fad. Indeed, there are many examples of such mentality that have swept through otherwise sedate, serious organisations. For example, for a while, everyone was excited over something called "quality circles" and "Theory Z" forms of Japanese-style management. Then everyone went "searching for excellence" before they found "process re-engineering." More recently "disruptive innovation" has been rolling around the globe. Whether these bandwagons are driven by evidence based research or are simply fads is usually determined with the passing of time. What we must try to avoid is sloppy thinking and the uncritical adoption of concepts. The original insight and context that gave rise to the concept can get lost as people scramble to jump on the bandwagon. This leads people to focusing on things that are often irrelevant or unrelated to the benefits the insight promised to deliver (Alexander & Korine, 2008) .
Issues unresolved by Open innovation
Despite its success -as measured by the amount of attention it has received in the R&D literature (see Table 1 ), the commercial success of Chesbrough"s books, and the willingness of big companies to embrace, implement and preach its principles -Open Innovation is not perfect. The most obvious shortcoming is that the model is inherently linear, and basically a variation on the well-known stage-gate model (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1986) without any feedback or feed-forward mechanisms. The only distinguishing difference is that in the Open Innovation model ideas (technologies; knowledge) can freely "fly in" and "fly out" of the funnel that runs from opportunity scanning to business incubation. This is visualized by a funnel that contains holes which enable the exchange of ideas along the way. However, the flow of the innovation trajectory is linearly forward.
New innovation models, such as the Cyclic Innovation Model (CIM; Berkhout et al., 2007) emphasize the importance of feed forward and feedback mechanisms, as well as the notion that innovation is inherently a cyclic process where new innovations build upon previous innovations.
Moreover, according to CIM innovation can start anywhere within the cycle; there is no fixed point of origin like those demarking the beginning of the outdated (but still widely used) "technologypush" and "market-pull" models. If anything, modern innovation models should once and for all get rid of the notion of linearity in the innovation process. Hence, it will be a significant improvement that the information sharing required to facilitate such learning can lead to the leakage of commercially sensitive knowledge (Hoecht & Trott, 1999; Norman, 2004) . Organisations participating in R&D alliances in particular face the challenge of attempting to maintain a sufficiently "open" knowledge exchange regime for meeting their collaborative R& D objectives while sufficiently controlling knowledge flows to minimise unintended leakage of sensitive knowledge and technologies (Oxley & Sampson, 2004) . The principle ways in which this trade-off can be addressed is either by careful design of suitable relationship governance structures and relationship management instruments or by attempting to limit the scope of alliance activities in terms of the degree of knowledge sharing (Oxley & Sampson, 2004) .
Clearly a strategy of open innovation may help to develop technology and business partners, but if a firm is openly sharing its knowledge and technology it should not be surprised to find a long queue of potential partners at its door. Of greater concern is that there have also been a few papers reminding practitioners and academics alike that the so-called closed model of innovation may still be most suitable for many firms. Indeed, the business press has been full of stories covering various alleged aspects of industrial espionage. Most notable of these are the Dyson case where it alleges that a former employee was hired to gather industrial secrets about its electric motors for German and Chinese firms. A similar case was revealed by GM when it alleged that a former employee was passing trade secrets about its Hybrid Technology to Chinese firms (see Table 5 ).
Firms needs to be careful that a partner does not simply run off with their technology. It may be that
together with an open innovation strategy a firm needs also to adopt a tight IP protection strategy. In many ways we are suggesting that if you are going to negotiate with partners about technology it is far better to negotiate from a position of strength. This can be achieved with effective IP protection.
Intellectual property (IP) is a company asset and should be treated and managed as such. Owning and acquiring IP will not overcome poor business strategy and make a company successful. IP is a broad concept and includes many different intangibles such as patents (inventions), copyright (works of authorship, software, drawings, etc) know-how (e.g. expertise, skilled craftsmanship, training capability, understanding of how something works), trade secrets (a protected formula or method), trademarks (logos, distinctive names), industrial design (the unique external appearance) and semi-conductor mask works (the physical design of semiconductor circuits). There are many examples of firms with exciting technology that failed to profit from it. Classic cases such as the EMI scanner (MRI) are taught to business students. This technology was developed by EMI but they failed to develop a business model to exploit it. If we now look more closely at developments in the literature, we can see useful contributions. The notion of appropriation governs a firm"s ability to capture the profits generated by an innovation (Teece, 1986) . It was this notion that forms the basis of recent classifications of open innovation into inbound Innovation and outbound innovation (Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009; Dahlander & Gann, 2010) . Inbound open innovation refers to internal use of external knowledge, whereas outbound open innovation refers to external exploitation of internal knowledge. This relates to the processes of knowledge exploration, retention, and exploitation that can be performed either inside or outside a firm (Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009 ).
When it comes to inbound innovation formal intellectual property rights (IPR) reduces transaction costs, hence firms often require that knowledge suppliers have formal IPR in place before they collaborate (Dahlander & Gann, 2010) . Those firms that require strong IPR to protect their knowledge remain reluctant to engage in external innovation (Gooroochurn & Hanley, 2007) . For outbound Innovation: firms that rely on trade secrets, formal agreements such as patents, copyright and trademarks, and lead time to protect their innovation are less likely to engage in external innovation and so they prefer to retain innovation in-house.
The size of a firm and its related resources is also a mediating variable here. For example, larger firms with greater co-specialized resources will be more successful in adopting inbound innovation (Licthentaler, 2008; Sandulli & Chesbrough, 2009 ). Whereas, smaller companies typically lack the capabilities to structure the process of searching and selecting external innovation, especially regarding decisions whether to file patents or disclose or anticipating the potential value of inbound innovation (Dahlander & Gann, 2010) . Small and medium sized enterprises ( 
Discussion
In this chapter we have argued support for not only the need for research to build on previous work, but also that those of us working within the field recognize the past contributions of others. The need for critical analysis within research is self-evident amongst academics. Those of us in the field would be correctly criticized if we did not hold up new concepts, theories and assertions and scrutinize them thoroughly. This is a slightly updated version of our 2009 paper (Trott & Hartmann, 2009 ) in which we first presented a critical review of Open Innovation. At that time, the new concept op Open Innovation had been widely praised and adopted but no critical analysis existed of the origin of the ideas it contained and the reality of the dichotomy it pretended to solve. We feel that the Open Innovation community has given insufficient credit to previous researchers who described, analyzed and argued in favor of most of the principles on which Open Innovation was founded, long before the term for this new model was actually coined. In fact, the Open Innovation concept would gain credibility when scientific evidence for the correctness of the basic principles of the model in the existing literature is recognized appropriately.
If Open Innovation is in essence nothing new, why then has this concept been so readily embraced by firms and the R&D community? Much of this surely is due to its simplicity (it is appealing because it is simple and retains the linear notion of science to marketplace) and the partial deception which was created by describing something which is undoubtedly true in itself (the limitations of closed innovation principles), but false in conveying the wrong impression that firms today still follow these principles. The open versus closed systems of innovation are presented as two alternatives faced by firms. This lends credence to the larger argument by giving the impression that the options are mutually exclusive, even though this is not the case. It is precisely the simplicity and the certainty of this logic that has enabled the design of a dichotomy. If something is not true, surely it must be false; if something is not false, surely it must be true. Stated another way: if something is wrong, then surely the opposite must be right. This sharp polarisation allows no middle ground. Yet something may be partly true and partly false.
Unmistakably, Chesbrough has been very successful in popularising the notion of technology transfer and the need to share and exchange knowledge. Indeed, it seems that in using a business strategy perspective the Open Innovation concept may have reached new audiences (e.g., CEOs of technology-intensive companies) that for so many years the innovation and R&D literatures failed to reach. The fact that large multinational companies such as Procter & Gamble and Philips have incorporated the principles of Open Innovation and facilitate conferences and publications on the subject deserves admiration and praise. In essence, it has created real-life laboratories (playgrounds) in which the mechanisms of Open Innovation can be studied in great detail (see, for example, Hacievliyagil, 2007 and Hacievliyagil, Auger & Hartmann, 2008) . We hope that, in the true realm of scientific experimentation, objective assessment of the results will lead to improvements in the theory of Open Innovation. What gives us cause for concern is that the CEOs that now seem to be showing interest in innovation management may become frustrated and disillusioned when it becomes clear that "open innovation" is not a panacea. The best way to avoid this from happening is to consider Open Innovation as a work in progress. In the true spirit of openness, additions and modifications to the Open Innovation model must be welcomed. It is therefore imperative that this work in progress is scrutinized against its own prescribing principles. To paraphrase just one principle of Open Innovation (not all the smart people in our field work for us): not all good ideas in innovation originate from Harvard Business School and the Haas School of Business.
In the four years since the publication of our original paper (Trott & Hartmann, 2009 ), we were pleased to see that it is one of the most cited papers published in the International Journal of Innovation Management. Despite all this attention and about three dozen papers that acknowledge (and in many cases agree with) our critical view on Open Innovation, "the father of open innovation" (as he is referred to in Chesbrough, 2012) , Henry Chesbrough, has carried on regardless despite the ten papers he has published since 2010.
